

UNITED NATIONS AND CLIMATE-INDUCED SECURITY CHALLENGES: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

The idea that climate change poses a threat to national security is not new, and academic experts have been mulling over the possibility of utilizing the United Nations Security Council to confront this threat for quite some time. However, in recent years there has been an increasing trend to perceive the possibility in terms of its substance. This might be attributed to a growing feeling of urgency. Despite the expanding body of research on the subject, there is still a lack of understanding on the types of actions that may be taken by the Security Council in the event that it decided to get involved in the issue of climate change and whether or not such actions would be possible. This paper seeks to begin to address this gap by analyzing the core legal and practical issues surrounding the potential for Council action in three key areas: the creation of climate mitigation obligations; the avoidance of existing commitments which risk posing a "regulatory chill" on climate measures; and the enforcement of conventional commitments. These three key areas are: the creation of climate mitigation obligations; the avoidance of existing commitments which risk posing a "regulatory chill;" and the enforcement of conventional commitments. In this approach, it attempts to encourage a more nuanced understanding of the Council's possible role in this area, which can be used to a variety of different scenarios and as a variably proportioned part of the larger international framework. This knowledge can be applied to a number of different scenarios and as an element that can be applied to a variety of different situations.

Keywords-: *United Nations, Climate, Security, Challenges, Policy.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The possibility of "climate-security," which alludes to the manners by which dangers and weaknesses to people, nations, and peacekeeping endeavors might be exacerbated by or made more powerless by climate change, has acquired unmistakable quality in both peacebuilding and the worldwide plan. Weather patterns throughout the world might restrict or jeopardize important resources including fisheries, arable land, drinking water, and the waters of major rivers. Shakiness, dislodging, and expanded rivalry inside and between States are as of now being connected to changes in transboundary water assets, food security, ocean levels, flood dangers, and relocation designs brought about by climate change. These changes call for broad transformation and moderation endeavors notwithstanding debacle risk decrease and versatility building methodologies. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has frequently accentuated the connection between protecting harmony and security and climate change. The commands of peacekeeping tasks and exceptional political missions, as well as the connections among security and steadiness in unambiguous regions or nations and climate change, have been progressively recognized by the UN Security Council.

Research has not demonstrated an immediate circumstances and logical results connection between the level of savagery and climate change. Rather, alongside a large group of different elements, for example, political drivers like gathering rejection, equipped collective vibes, administration issues or inconsistencies, levels of neediness or imbalance, movement, and other financial elements, climate change is remembered to meaningfully affect levels of savagery. Variations in the temperature and weather in a particular area can lead to a shortage of resources (water, arable land, etc.), which can strain living standards, raise the risk of food insecurity, and fuel conflict and rivalry over these few resources. But this is always in addition to other things like other environmental degradation sources, bad governance, inadequate or nonexistent dispute resolution procedures, unequal distribution and access to natural resources, and additional sources of conflict or tension between communities or across international borders.




Figure 1: climate change and associated issue

Climate change may have more profound repercussions on individuals who are already vulnerable, both at the macro and individual levels, because it might operate as a "risk multiplier," aggravating pre-existing vulnerabilities and conflict drivers. There is widespread agreement that low-income, unstable countries—and usually the poorest and most vulnerable populations within them—are being disproportionately affected by climate change. People who already have few resources for coping—whether from poverty, inequality, other sources of conflict, or social and political marginalization—may find it more difficult to recover from extreme weather shocks like drought and flooding that occur more frequently or intensely. The disparate effects of climate change on women and girls have drawn special attention because of the potential for substantial limitations on adaptation and coping mechanisms resulting from the gender disparities and structural impediments that are common in many nations. A higher likelihood of violence against women and girls has also been noted by some practitioners in circumstances where resource and livelihood restrictions have grown due to climate change and other causes.

While many have noted the possible dangers of additional environmental degradation (whether caused by climate change or not), there has also been a great deal of interest in the ways that group

action on these issues, whether locally, nationally, or internationally, may present chances for establishing and maintaining peace. The UN Water Conference in 2023 brought attention to the "catalytic role" that raising awareness of water-related concerns may have in promoting peace and security. It gave the accompanying model: "Key laid out vehicles to improve provincial participation, coordinate water cooperation across stream, lake, and spring frameworks, and consequently add to the advancement of harmony and security are local mix components, as exemplified in Africa through the territorial financial communities. "Developing interest has been seen at the community level in what has been designated "positive" or "ecological" peacebuilding, which depends on the thought that figuring out together on natural problems might not just assistance at any point address the reasons for struggle or brutality yet additionally give opportunities to address other peacebuilding goals and carry extra advantages to harmony.

2. THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE, AND SECURITY

There is a complex, circuitous, and non-direct connection among security and climate change. Proof from all through the globe demonstrates that climate change can increment gambles known to add to insecurity, overpower state limit, and make currently weak gatherings more defenseless, even while no contention is monocausal and doesn't straightforwardly cause rough clash. These dangers have exceptionally contextualized pathways that are formed by the limited connection of climatic stressors with openness factors, as well as cultural weakness and adapting skills.

Certain effects of climate change on security are more noticeable and happen right away. For instance, a great deal of tiny islands and low-lying coastal regions are extremely vulnerable to the threats associated with sea level rise, such as floods, saltwater intrusion, and infrastructure damage that might destroy livelihoods and force populations to relocate. More complex effects are experienced through channels including food insecurity, poverty, and rising inequality. However, further effects could manifest at the level of intricate human systems, where the cumulative effects of climate change might influence global food prices, employment markets, and geopolitical stability.




Figure 2: Climate change, natural resource depletion, human demands, and social stability: causes and potential solutions.

The outcomes of the relationships between climate change and security are significantly shaped by a variety of contextual variables, such as reliance on natural capital, the history of conflicts, and the standard of governance. Human, community, state, and international security may be impacted by the interplay between climate change and other elements when crucial thresholds are crossed and coping mechanisms are undermined. climatic-related security threats have the potential to set off negative feedback loops and precipitate a downward spiral of climatic catastrophes and conflict in fragile and conflict-affected areas. But the security implications of this interaction don't just manifest as violent conflict; they may also manifest as other forms of insecurity, such as organized crime, armed gang activity, and violence against women and girls. Extensive risk analysis is useful in determining if a given scenario meets the requirements for increased risk of insecurity due to climate change impacts.

The intersection of war and climate concerns is confirmed by recent data, which demonstrates that substantial land areas and/or populations in fragile nations are at significant risk from climate change. In fact, 70% of the nations in the lowest quartile of those most susceptible to climate change are also among the world's most fragile. This emphasizes how important it is to address

fragility, conflict risks, and climate change all at once. Simultaneously, in unstable and conflict-affected nations, the planning and execution of climate change adaptation programmes is falling behind schedule, and new delivery methods are desperately needed. Given the interdependence of climate change, catastrophes, and conflicts, our actions must take into account the complexity and interconnectedness of hazards.

3. CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE AND SECURITY

The essential expert for safeguarding world harmony and security has been appointed to the UN Council under Article 24 of the UN Contract. Traditional thoughts of harmony and security, which commonly focus just on the absence of vicious struggle, cannot effectively oblige the issues presented by climate change. The Council also has to decide how best to allocate its time and resources. There are already a lot of crises on its agenda that are clearly direct causes of instability. Some people wonder how much time the Council should spend on security and climate issues when there are more pressing risks to peace and security in certain circumstances.

The strongest defense against climate change's worst effects on security is a sharp decline in carbon emissions worldwide. Since the UNFCCC fills in as the fundamental stage for chasing after these sorts of drives, it is unreasonable to guess that the Security Council would play a main job in this regard. The Council is additionally very unlikely to force sanctions on the nations that produce the most carbon dioxide, particularly since a portion of its extremely durable individuals are among the best polluters on the planet and would be hesitant to force sanctions on themselves.

Besides, the association among war and climate change is nuanced and ineffectively understood. In one article, the writers reach the determination that low financial turn of events, low state limit, intergroup imbalance, and a background marked by struggle are the variables generally connected with struggle hazard and that "climate fluctuation or potentially change is coming up short on the positioned rundown of most compelling clash drivers across experience to date." The article depends on interviews with twelve unmistakable social researchers. It is "limitedly understood" that there are "outstanding uncertainties about climate-struggle joins," "whether through agribusiness, financial shocks, calamities or movement." Moreover, despite the fact that there are

many variables that can add to or worsen struggle, it tends to be challenging to decide the exact job that climate change plays or the overall strength of its effect. This calculated equivocality then makes it trying to give valuable policy suggestions, which represents a test for the UN Security Council in thinking of pragmatic answers for address the security ramifications of climate change. Struggle modelers agree on the meaning of various relevant components, however they can't concur upon a solitary "base model" to which climate-related highlights might be added, as Conca has noted.

Powerful reasons exist to support the Security Council's cooperation on climate change and security, despite these applied difficulties. Sakaguchi et al. see that "62.3 percent of the examinations find proof that climate change factors are related with more significant levels of contention," despite their questions about the strength of the connection between climate change and security. They proceed to say that further exploration is expected to completely grasp how climate change has an impact in the causal pathways that lead to war. In particular, the creators of a new paper assessing the writing over the past decade on the association among security and climate change bring up that "the greater part of the survey concentrates on viewed as here have called for more examination that unequivocally explores pathways and halfway factors a contention for more exploration on this relationship, as opposed to an excusal."

Besides, the possibility that climate change increments risk is broadly acknowledged. Among its unfavorable effects, climate change can "increment asset requests, natural debasement and uneven turn of events, and worsen existing delicacy and struggle gambles," as per the creators of a paper on climate policy co-distributed by two of the country's top research organizations. The steadiness of nations and social orders is tested by the results of climate change, they add, in spite of the fact that assuming it is "seldom an immediate reason for conflict...there is more than adequate proof that its belongings fuel significant drivers and logical elements of contention and delicacy." It is also obvious that future conflicts will be more likely to be impacted by climate change given the current failure of mitigation measures to slow down global warming. The climate problem may force the Council to act more and more as its security consequences worsen. Meanwhile, the

Council is obligated by the Charter to avoid conflicts, which encourages addressing climate concerns before they escalate into violent incidents.

4. SECURITY COUNCIL INVOLVEMENT: HISTORICAL PROGRESSION AND FUNDAMENTAL THEMES

The Council's support in climate and security issues has proceeded and strengthened throughout recent years, despite the troublesome way it has navigated beginning around 2007. Topical meetings on climate change and security are extending, and Security Council ends are progressively consolidating phrasing connected with the two issues.

There have been numerous effective conversations on security and climate change in the Security Council. Whenever the Council first explicitly tended to climate change as a subject was on April 17, 2007, during an open clerical discussion coordinated by the UK that included an instructions from Secretary-General Boycott Ki-moon and examined the associations between energy, security, and climate.²⁴The Gathering of 77 (G77) + China and the Neutral Development (NAM) composed the Security Council before to the gathering to voice their interests about obstruction with the functioning of the Financial and Social Council and the Overall Get together. After some time, there have been divisions on this matter inside the NAM and the G77, with specific individuals from the two associations underwriting Council cooperation on security and climate change.

Yet again on July 20, 2011, the Council gathered to talk about climate change. Germany had ignited the open discussion, which included briefings from Secretary-General Boycott and the Chief Overseer of the UN Climate Program, Achim Steiner.²⁵ After extended thoughts, it at long last acknowledged an official proclamation that was just concluded during the debate.²⁶ The US representative, Susan Rice, communicated her disappointment with the Council's failure to "arrive at agreement on even a basic draft official explanation that climate change can possibly affect harmony and security despite the manifest proof that it does" from the get-go in the gathering, when the report's future was still hanging out there. It would be "despicable" and "a forsakenness of obligation" in the event that an understanding couldn't be reached.

In spite of the fact that it was brief in satisfied, the president's articulation was the Security Council's first and, as of mid-2021, its sole topical result on security and climate change. Yet again the UN Structure Show on Climate Change was referred to as "the critical instrument for tending to climate change." It voiced stress that a few current threats to worldwide harmony and security may ultimately turn out to be more regrettable because of the adverse consequences of climate change. Moreover, that's what it expressed "when such issues are drivers of contention, address a test to the execution of Council commands or jeopardize the course of combination of harmony," struggle examination and logical data on the potential security ramifications of climate genuinely must change be remembered for the Secretary-General's reports. For various years, the UN Secretariat's powerlessness to do this solicitation added to the general absence of execution of the official assertion. In any case, since the Climate-Security System was laid out in 2018 — a little group inside the Secretariat that means to work on the association's capacity to answer climate-related security chances — activity has expanded.

Five topic meetings (four open discussions and one discussion) with an extraordinary spotlight on climate change and security have been held by the Council starting around 2018. The month-to-month Security Council presidents have coordinated these topical gatherings since they accept that the connection between climate change and security is sufficiently critical to be remembered for optional occasions during their administration, despite the fact that climate change is definitely not a proper plan thing with an ordinary revealing cycle. These remembered an open conversation for "Understanding and tending to climate-related security gambles" on July 11, 2018, coordinated by Sweden; an open conversation on "Tending to the effects of climate-related fiasco on worldwide harmony and security" on January 25, 2019, coordinated by the Dominican Republic; an open conversation on "climate and security" on July 24, 2020, coordinated by Germany; an open conversation on "Philanthropic impacts of ecological debasement and harmony and security".

Germany endeavored to look for a topical goal on climate change and security preceding the July 2020 open conversation. This try was thoroughly examined. Germany made it clear in its mission for the 2019-2020 Council term that security and climate change would be main concerns, and even before it joined the Council, it was pondering seeking after a subject end on this point. It

worked together on the text's improvement for quite a long time with nine additional individuals. While trying to prevail upon the excess individuals from the Council (China, Indonesia, South Africa, Russia, and the US), these individuals — Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Niger, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, UK, and Vietnam — should co-support the draft. Because of their capacity to reject the draft, the three extremely durable individuals from this gathering — China, Russia, and the United States — were the focal point of support.

The draft had grand objectives. It asked the Secretary-General to ponder what the outcomes of climate change might mean for security in different settings, from helpful alleviation to peacebuilding help and struggle counteraction. One of the draft's most significant components was that it asked the Secretary-General:

- To present a report in something like a half year of the reception of the goal (and at regular intervals from there on) on the security ramifications of the adverse consequences of climate change;
- To delegate an Extraordinary Agent who might be liable for organizing the UN's endeavors to address climate-related security dangers, as well concerning supporting for these endeavors and trading data on climate-security dangers inside the UN framework and with outside entertainers;
- To distinguish Climate and Security Counsels to be sent in important field activities and approach mission authority.

But given the political atmosphere, the draught had to be shelved well in advance of the open discussion on July 24. The US voiced the biggest resistance to the idea, while China and Russia did not support it. According to reports, US Ambassador Kelly Craft stated that Washington was ordering the US delegation to obstruct a theme conclusion on security and climate.

5. POLICY INITIATIVES AND BEST PRACTICES

In order to handle security risks brought on by climate change, a number of effective policies and procedures have evolved throughout time. The incorporation of climatic factors into national security strategy is one such instance. Numerous nations have established strategies to proactively

counteract these concerns after realizing how climate change might intensify security issues. To assess and manage vulnerabilities associated to climate change to national security, for example, the United States has adopted the Climate Security Plan. This strategy outlines tactics for guarding military installations, evaluating how climate change may affect security operations, and working with foreign partners on climate security-related concerns.

Furthermore, strategies that priorities readiness and catastrophe risk reduction have been shown to be successful in reducing security challenges brought on by climate change. Purchasing early warning systems, robust infrastructure, and disaster response tools are frequently part of these strategies. For example, Japan's experience with earthquakes and typhoons has contributed to the creation of a strong system for disaster planning and response, which has reduced security threats and saved many lives during climate-related disasters.

5.1. Lessons learned from successful initiatives:

The value of early action and preventative measures is among the most important lessons to be drawn from programmes that are successful. It is frequently more economical to address security risks brought on by climate change when action is done before situations get worse. Various contextual analyses exhibit how nations and regions that have made interests in variation and relief procedures are more qualified to manage the security dangers presented by climate change. In this sense, early warning systems and risk assessments have been essential in enabling prompt reactions to climate-related incidents.

Another vital lesson is the need of global collaboration. Climate change is a worldwide peculiarity, and security issues habitually have territorial or global repercussions. Initiatives that have been successful have shown the necessity of international cooperation in addressing common security threats. For instance, the Paris Agreement, which acknowledges the interdependence of climate, peace, and security, marks a turning point in international collaboration to address climate change.

Moreover, adaptability and flexibility are crucial while implementing policies. Policies must be created with flexibility to accommodate new knowledge and shifting conditions, since climate change is a dynamic and ever-evolving problem. In order to be effective in the face of changing

security risks caused by climate change, successful projects have shown the importance of routinely evaluating and revising policies. This flexible strategy guarantees the long-term relevance and robustness of security measures.

6. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The dynamic character of security issues brought on by climate change offers a complex picture of what lies ahead. Climate change is a dynamic phenomenon, with its impacts growing more intricate and widespread as the world warms. We should expect a wide range of security issues that are either brought on by or made worse by climate change in the upcoming years. These difficulties include a lack of food, harsh weather, rising sea levels, and an increase in migration. These problems are especially difficult because they are interconnected; they frequently reinforce one another and have a cascade impact that may make governance difficult and conflict worse.

Rising temperatures increase the likelihood of resource-driven conflicts. Tensions both within and between communities can result from competition for scarce resources such as arable land and freshwater supplies. Global resource management policy must be proactive and egalitarian in light of the possibility of resource-related violence. Climate-related security issues are not limited to particular areas; they have the capacity to worsen into worldwide emergencies, necessitating concerted action by international institutions, such as the UN.

Global security is significantly impacted by security issues brought on by climate change. Even if precise situations are hard to forecast, there are a few possible future events that should be taken seriously. A rise in migration brought on by the climate is one scenario. Droughts, severe weather, and rising sea levels have the potential to uproot millions of people both domestically and internationally. Conflicts over territory and resources might result from the strain this flood of climate refugees is putting on the social, economic, and political structures of host nations and regions.

The vulnerability of tiny island states is a further situation. These countries are facing existential dangers as sea levels rise. Population relocation and the loss of land and resources can cause instability in the region and raise the need for outside help. The ramifications for security reach

regions that are often thought to be more stable. For instance, even affluent countries are vulnerable to the effects of climate change due to the increasing likelihood of extreme weather, cyberattacks on vital infrastructure, and disruptions to the economy. The necessity of resilience and adaptability in many areas is highlighted by these dangers.

The international community has to give cooperative efforts to solve climate-related security concerns top priority in light of these potential possibilities. It is essential to implement early warning systems, conflict avoidance techniques, and adaptation and mitigation measures. To reduce the possible security threats associated with climate change, the UN and other international organizations must take the lead in promoting sustainable development, humanitarian aid, and collaboration. The world can better prepare for a future in which climate change and security are inexorably connected by acknowledging the developing nature of these concerns and taking proactive measures to address them.

7. CONCLUSION

The Security Council is discussing whether climate change represents a threat to public safety to an ever-increasing extent. Gatherings on climate change and security (and related subjects) are being called all the more every now and again, goals are remembering phrasing for climate change and security, and different methodology are being set up to help with the Council's figure out on this issue. Notwithstanding, it is trying to foresee how the Council will keep on connecting on security and climate change. Albeit most of this organ's individuals are committed to serving on the Council, a couple of strong individuals have compelling conclusions in regards to how long and cash ought to be spent on battling climate change. Besides, the Council is right now endeavoring to decide the particular idea of the test (which changes concurring on the unique circumstance) and the additional worth that the Council offers of real value while handling security and climate-related issues. Its outcomes might have critical political and legitimate implications, yet incorporating them will cost cash and skill. The Council has asked for further developed giving an account of climate-security concerns and stressed the requirement for risk appraisals and chance administration plans in unambiguous conditions. Nonetheless, in the event that supporting isn't

accessible for climate counselors in harmony tasks, doing these activities will be more troublesome.

The climate calamity is probably going to deteriorate regardless of whether the most pessimistic scenario circumstances are deflected. Its impacts on human security will deteriorate, featuring the associations among struggle and climate-related concerns. On the off chance that the Council doesn't act in such a situation, it will be viewed as withdrawn from the fundamental threats to worldwide harmony, security, and human existence.

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